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Abstract 
We analyse empirically the effects of urbanization on Italian college graduates' work 
possibilities as entrepreneurs three years after graduation. We find that doubling the 
population density of the province of work reduces the chances of being an entrepreneur by 
2-3 percentage points. This result holds after controlling for regional fixed effects and is 
robust to instrumenting urbanization. Provincial competition, urban amenities and 
disamenities, cost of labour, earning differentials between employees and self-employed 
workers, unemployment rates and value added per capita account for more than half of the 
negative urbanization penalty. Our result cannot be explained by the presence of negative 
differentials in returns to entrepreneurship between the most and the least densely populated 
areas either. In fact, as long as they succeed in entering the most densely populated markets, 
young entrepreneurs are able to reap the benefits of urbanization externalities: doubling the 
population density of the province of work increases entrepreneurs' net monthly earnings by 
2-3 per cent.  
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The literature on agglomeration has mainly studied the impact of urbanization economies
(i.e. the externalities arising from the level of cities’ economic activities as a whole but
external to speciﬁc industries)1 on ﬁrms rather than on entrepreneurs. According to the
theory, urbanization externalities encourage ﬁrms to locate in the most densely populated
markets where productivity is highest (see, for instance, Ciccone and Hall (1996), Ciccone
(2002) and Moomaw, 1983), the expected quality of the employer-employee match is best
(Helsley and Strange (1990), Kim, 1990), search costs per worker are lowest (Wheeler,
2001), and learning, the diﬀusion of technological spillovers and the acquisition of en-
trepreneurial capabilities are fastest (see Guiso and Schivardi (2007) and Rosenthal and
Strange (2004) for a review of the literature). However, after a certain threshold con-
gestion disexternalities prevail over agglomeration economies and some sort of selection
into the densest markets is needed. Firms might be selected on the basis of their order of
arrival (e.g. Helsley and Strange, 1990), productivity (as in Behrens and Robert-Nicoud,
2008), Darwinian selection (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008), the extent they beneﬁt from
forward-backward linkages (Baldwin and Okubo, 2006), or simply on the basis of their
sector (Henderson (1983), LaFountain, 2005).
In contrast with the majority of the agglomeration literature, we estimate urbaniza-
tion eﬀects on entrepreneurs rather than on ﬁrms or employees. In particular, we examine
whether population density in the individual’s province of work increases the probability
of being an entrepreneur and/or creates urban diﬀerentials in the returns to entrepreneur-
ship. While ﬁrm type (e.g. sector, size, etc.) is certainly a determinant of location, as
some sectors depend more on scale, urban amenities and local endowment of natural
resources than others, entrepreneurs’ characteristics (e.g. ability, education, experience,
age) may also matter.
To this end we use a unique data set provided by the Italian Institute of Statistics
1 As opposed to localization economies, internal to each industry (Henderson, 1983).
5(ISTAT), examining college-to-work transitions three years after graduation. Although
university graduates represent just 11 per cent of Italian entrepreneurs, using this data
source has the advantage of providing a homogeneous sample of individuals facing similar
work choices (i.e. graduates at the same stage of the life-cycle). Moreover, focusing on
graduates minimizes the probability of including ’out of necessity’ entrepreneurs in our
sample, since the individuals choosing self-employment because of a lack of outside options
are generally the least educated workers (the ’ability-bias’ hypothesis). Several studies
have shown that the ability-bias can be quite important: in the US, for instance, up to 10
per cent of entrepreneurs become such because of a lack of suitable alternatives rather than
in order to pursue an opportunity (see Poschke (2008), Lazear, 2005). Another advantage
of our data set is that the limited mobility of labour in Italy reduces the likelihood that our
urbanization estimates are biased by sorting into the most densely populated provinces
(i.e. entrepreneurs with unobserved characteristics correlated to work choices moving into
the most densely populated markets). Indeed, according to ISTAT (ISTAT, 2003) in Italy
more than 80 per cent of individuals whose parents are living in the same municipality
as them, about 7 per cent reside in a municipality within 16 kilometres of their parents,
and only 8.2 per cent live abroad or at a distance greater than 50 kilometres. Apart
from cultural reasons (see, for instance, Alesina et al., 2010), the strong family ties in
Italy are due to the lack of a good welfare system, leaving elderly care largely to oﬀspring
and child care to grandparents. However, entrepreneurs have further reasons to live close
to their place of origin as they might be willing to exploit the local family networks to
start their business (personal contacts and customer base). Michelacci and Silva (2007),
for instance, show that in both Italy and the US entrepreneurs are more likely to obtain
bank credit when the ﬁrm is local and that the probability of working in the province
of birth is greater for entrepreneurs (whether or not start-ups) than for employees. This
result is in line with Blanchﬂower (2000), who ﬁnds that in most OECD countries self-
employed workers are less willing to move from their neighbourhood, town or region than
6employees. In particular, of the 23 OECD country analysed in his paper Italy has the
smallest number of self-employed individuals who are willing to move. In Italy mobility
is surprisingly limited also among students, who are generally one of the most mobile
segments of the population, even in the areas with low-quality universities (such as the
South). Indeed, according to Brunello and Cappellari (2008) almost three-quarters of
Southern students graduate in the South, and just 8 per cent (20 per cent) of them move
to the North (Centre) in spite of the fact that individuals graduating from a Northern
university earn higher employment-weighted wages than those graduating in the South.2
We deﬁne ’entrepreneurs’ all the individuals who either describe themselves as such or
as own-account workers and professionals during the interview (see Section 2 for further
details). Contrary to the predictions of the literature on agglomeration, we ﬁnd that,
other things being equal, three years after graduation more college graduates are likely
to start an activity of their own in the least densely populated provinces. In particular,
doubling the population density in the province of work reduces the probability of being
an entrepreneur by about 2-3 percentage points. This penalty persists after instrumenting
urbanization with population density in 1921. We then investigate whether our ﬁndings
can be explained by across-province diﬀerentials in competition, urban amenities and dis-
amenities, labour costs, outside options, unemployment rates, and value added per capita.
Our results indicate that overall these province characteristics account for more than half
of the negative urbanization eﬀect. Finally, we investigate whether the sign of our urban-
ization outcome can be explained by the presence of negative diﬀerentials in returns to
entrepreneurship between the most and the least densely populated markets, similarly to
Di Addario and Patacchini (2008) and de Blasio and Di Addario (2005), who ﬁnd that
the most highly educated employees earn relatively less in the urban or industrially ag-
glomerated areas than elsewhere in Italy, in contrast with the least educated workers. In
2 The authors ascribe the low student mobility to North-South cost diﬀerentials (university fees, rents,
etc.), rather than to the existence of ﬁnancial constraints. According to Makovec (2006), Southerners
graduating in the North earn 25 per cent more than those who stay and 6 per cent more than those who
move to the North after graduation.
7fact, we ﬁnd that returns to entrepreneurship increase with population density: doubling
the province of work population density increases entrepreneurs’ net monthly earnings by
2-3 per cent.
This last result, which is in line with the literature predicting that agglomeration ex-
ternalities increase productivity in the most densely populated markets (for evidence on
Italy see, for instance, Cingano and Schivardi (2004) and Guiso and Schivardi, forthcom-
ing), poses an apparent puzzle: why is the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur less
in the densest provinces, given that returns to entrepreneurship increase with population
density? A possible explanation of this puzzling result is that the least densely populated
markets facilitate entrepreneurship by reducing the costs of setting up a ﬁrm. Indeed,
we ﬁnd that the presence of local banks, inversely correlated with population density,
increases the likelihood of becoming entrepreneur three years after graduation, imply-
ing that entry costs are an important determinant in young graduates’ work decisions.
Conversely, we obtain that entry into the most densely populated markets is particularly
diﬃcult for young entrepreneurs, especially because of tougher competition.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data and pro-
vides descriptive statistics. Section 3 presents the econometric results and the robustness
checks, Section 4 tests alternative hypotheses potentially explaining our results, Section 5
investigates whether there are earning diﬀerentials, and the last section concludes.
2 The data
The main data source of this paper is the Survey on the Early Career of College Gradu-
ates (SECCG, ”Indagine sull’inserimento professionale dei laureati”) conducted by ISTAT
every three years. We analyse the individuals who graduated in 1995, 1998 and 2001, and
interviewed, respectively, in 1998, 2001 and 2004. In the ﬁrst semester of each survey
year ISTAT extracts a random sample (about 16 per cent of the total) from the universe
of the individuals graduating in that year, stratiﬁed on the basis of gender, faculty and
8university. In the second semester ISTAT interviews the sampled individuals by phone,
double-checking all answers with universities’ administrative records. Among the Italian
surveys currently available, the SECCG oﬀers the most precise and detailed information
on demographic characteristics, university attended, ability, family background, current
employment and income of recently graduated individuals. The survey also collects in-
formation on the province of work, enabling us to compute the impact of urbanization
on the probability of transition from university to entrepreneurship. To compute the ur-
banization variable, we merge our data set with the Census population density by year
of interview and province of work (the ﬁnest disaggregation available in the survey). Our
sample is distributed in all the 103 Italian provinces. We complement the data base
with other variables at the provincial level drawn from various sources (described in the
Appendix).
Our sample, consisting of 33,740 college graduates, has been obtained after exclud-
ing over 35 year-old individuals, foreigners, Italians working abroad, agricultural-sector
workers and non-employed people. Moreover, we exclude individuals who were already
employed in their current job before graduating because we intend to focus on work choices
after graduation and the former might be a selected sample of the working population.
Seventeen per cent of our sampled individuals are entrepreneurs (Table 1). In addition
to the individuals who identify themselves as such, our deﬁnition of entrepreneur includes
professionals and excludes members of a family business, similarly to Michelacci and Silva
(2007). Indeed, like entrepreneurs, own-account workers and professionals take decisions
independently and are risk-bearing, since they are personally liable for their business
activity. Conversely, family business members are often not involved in decision-making
and do not necessarily share the risk with the ﬁrm owner. Unlike Michelacci and Silva,
we exclude managers (as we do not have this piece of information) and craft workers,
because in Italy, where the pressure of taxation and employees’ contributions is high,
the recorded information on this self-employment category might be measured incorrectly
9because of the greater facility of tax evasion. Our deﬁnition also excludes quasi-employees
with co.co.co (collaboration) contracts because they generally perform the same tasks as
employees in spite of the fact that they are considered self-employed by ISTAT (because
they have none of the guarantees of payroll employees).
To analyse the diﬀerences in the distribution of our variables between the most and
the least densely populated markets we provide the descriptive statistics for the total
sample, the individuals working in the top 10th percentile of Italian province population
density distribution, and those employed in the rest of the country (Table 1). As expected,
a larger share of entrepreneurs and employees works in the most densely populated ar-
eas than elsewhere (respectively, 16 and 71 per cent against 15 and 65 per cent in the
least dense markets), while there is no diﬀerence in the spatial distribution of the other
categories of self-employed workers. Moreover, monthly earnings from entrepreneurship
are 10 per cent higher in the most densely populated provinces than in the rest of the
country. The least densely populated provinces exhibit a slightly larger share of women
and older people than the densest ones. Provinces also diﬀer with respect to the type
of school attended: students choose upper secondary schools (liceo) more frequently in
the most densely populated areas, and technical or teacher-training schools in the least
dense markets. University graduates obtain higher ﬁnal grades, on average, in the least
densely populated provinces, although a larger percentage of individuals graduate on time
in the densest markets. The share of graduates who hold a Ph.D. does not vary across
provinces of diﬀerent density levels. In line with the literature, human capital intensity
is positively correlated with population density: the share of individuals whose parents
have a secondary education or a university degree is larger in the most densely populated
provinces, while the share of parents with a primary or lower secondary school certiﬁcate
is smaller. The densest markets also have a larger share of self-employed workers’ oﬀ-
spring than others, suggesting that intergenerational persistence is positively correlated
with population density.
10With respect to the variables at the provincial level, urban disamenities (i.e. house
prices) and competition (i.e. the share of self-employed workers in the individual’s sector)
are greater in the most densely populated markets than in the rest of the country. In
contrast, but in line with the literature, the share of local banks is negatively correlated
with population density. In particular, 40 per cent (29 per cent) of the banks in the least
(most) densely populated markets are local.
3 Results
3.1 Chances of being an entrepreneur
The descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 show that the fraction of recently graduated
entrepreneurs is 1 percentage point higher in the most densely populated provinces than
in the rest of the country, in line with the predictions of the agglomeration theory. In
this section we test empirically whether this result holds after controlling for individual
characteristics. In particular, we estimate the impact of population density on the likeli-
hood of being an entrepreneur three years after graduation. We use a probit model and
correct the standard errors for the possibility that the residuals are interdependent at the
provincial level (33,740 observations distributed in three time periods over 103 provinces
provide our estimations with suﬃcient degrees of freedom; see Card, 2001). Using re-
peated cross-sectional data we estimate the following equation on the sample of employed
individuals:
Prob(Entreprijt = 1) = α + ΣβXijt + δDENjt + γRFEj + λt + uijt, (1)
where Entreprijt is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual i working in
province j and interviewed at time t is an entrepreneur; DEN is the province of work
11population density (our urbanization variable), X indicates the personal observable char-
acteristics, t the year-of-interview dummies, and RFE the region-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects,
capturing, for instance, the impact of local taxes or the presence of natural advantages or
amenities (see Ciccone (2002) and Rosenthal and Strange, 2003).
The ﬁrst column of Table 2 shows our basic speciﬁcation, including sex, age, edu-
cation, civil status and number of siblings as individual characteristics. In the second
column (2.2) we add the secondary school and faculty-group attended, because some
types of training are more suitable for entrepreneurship than others. In column 2.3 we
include the eﬀect of intergenerational persistence with two dummy variables equal to one
if the individual’s father and/or mother are/were self-employed. We also add a proxy of
family networks (equal to one if the individual found the job or started his/her activity
through the help of relatives or friends, zero otherwise), which might facilitate access to
entrepreneurship through personal and business contacts or customer base (Blanchﬂower,
2000). In the same speciﬁcation we also control for parents’ education level. In column
2.4 we add a few proxies for ability (mark obtained at university, a dummy for graduating
with honours, and a variable equal to one if the student graduated on time) and two
variables denoting whether the individual was working – occasionally or continuously –
while studying. Finally, in speciﬁcation 2.5 we add individuals’ work experience (number
of months worked) and sector of employment, because some industries require a larger
amount of initial capital than others (see, for instance, Rajan and Zingales, 1998).
Results indicate that doubling the population density of the province of work lowers
the chances of being entrepreneur by 2-3 percentage points. This result is stable across
all the speciﬁcations (columns 2.1-2.5) and always signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent statistical
level.3
3 We also tested whether our results hold when measuring urbanization with the provincial density
of graduates (rather than with overall population density). Indeed, it might be the case that graduates’
productivity increases more with proximity to other highly educated workers than with vicinity to low-
skilled people (see Rosenthal and Strange, 2008), because graduate entrepreneurs might have more to
learn from nearby human capital. Nevertheless, the results of this exercise (available on request) remain
unchanged with respect to those reported in Table 2. Thus, our ﬁndings are not sensitive to the choice
of the population of reference.
12When analysing some of the other covariates, we ﬁnd that women are less likely to
become entrepreneurs. In contrast, age and being married increase the chances of en-
trepreneurship, while having a Ph.D. does not have any eﬀect. This result is not sur-
prising because in Italy very few graduates enrol in and complete a Ph.D. three years
after graduation (just 0.2 per cent of our sampled individuals). Having attended the
science, chemistry, humanities and foreign language faculties reduces the likelihood of
starting an activity of one’s own, while attending the majority of the remaining facul-
ties (e.g. engineering, architecture, agriculture, law) and vocational schools (specialized
in industrial subjects) increases it. Most importantly, we ﬁnd evidence of intergenera-
tional persistence: having a self-employed father or mother increases the probability of
becoming an entrepreneur. Moreover, the family network proxy increases the chances of
entrepreneurship, as expected. In contrast, ﬁnal marks and the honours dummy are non-
signiﬁcant, while having graduated on time is signiﬁcantly positive. The non-signiﬁcance
of the former might be due to the fact that cognitive ability does not fully capture the
capabilities required to become an entrepreneur (although many empirical papers proxy
entrepreneurial ability just with education; e.g. Poschke (2008), Le (1999) and Calvo
and Wellisz, 1980). Indeed, being an entrepreneur has probably more to do with being
multifaceted (i.e. well-versed in various ﬁelds, able to perform a large number of diﬀerent
tasks and manage diﬀerent people), eﬃcient, and well-organized. According to the Jack-
of-All-Trades entrepreneur hypothesis (see Lazear, 2005) entrepreneurship is favoured by
a balanced mix of skills across various ﬁelds of expertise, which is innate rather than
acquired at school (Silva, 2007). Conversely, being able to organize one’s self so as to
graduate on time is a quality better reﬂecting the capabilities required for working as
an entrepreneur than marks, especially in the light of the fact that in Italy most people
graduate with some delay (just 15 per cent of the sampled individuals graduated on time;
Table 1).4
4 We are aware of the fact that the graduating-on-time eﬀect might be aﬀected by reverse causation
(if the students wanting to be entrepreneurs ﬁnished university in a shorter time than the others), as
133.2 The potential endogeneity problem
Our estimates of urbanization are unbiased and consistent only under the hypothesis that
we have not omitted any variable correlated to provincial population density. Conversely,
if individuals’ composition across markets of diﬀerent density varied along unobservable
dimensions that aﬀected the probability of being an entrepreneur, the urbanization esti-
mates in the previous section would be biased and inconsistent. In particular, the negative
urbanization eﬀect could be due (entirely or in part) to a larger endowment of people less
capable of becoming entrepreneurs in the most densely populated markets for unobserv-
able reasons, although this would be in contrast with the literature (e.g. Nocke, 2006).
In this section we deal with the potential endogeneity problem by instrumenting ur-
banization with pre-World War II population density (in 1921), similarly to Ciccone and
Hall (1996), Rice, Patacchini and Venables (2006), Combes et al. (2008) and Guiso and
Schivardi (forthcoming). Indeed, while the population density distribution has been sta-
ble over time, its 1921 pattern should have no direct eﬀect on current entrepreneurship
chances besides the indirect impact through current population density.
Results are reported in Table 3. Strikingly, we obtain the same outcome as before
across all the columns (replicating Table 2’s speciﬁcations), showing no evidence of a sys-
tematic bias in the OLS regressions, thus supporting our causal interpretation of urban-
ization.5 In particular, doubling the provincial population density reduces the probability
of being an entrepreneur by 2-3 percentage points (at the 1 per cent statistical signiﬁcance
level).
Table 3 also reports the ﬁrst-stage results of the instrument used, the pseudo R-squared
statistic and a measure of instrument relevance. As expected, population density in 1921
is positive and signiﬁcant (at the 1 per cent level) across all the columns. The partial
suggested by an anonymous referee. However, to the extent that occupational choices are made after
graduation or towards the end of college, the graduating-on-time variable would not suﬀer from this
problem. Nevertheless, our urbanization results are robust to excluding this variable from the regressions.
5 Note that other papers using Italian data ﬁnd that OLS and IV urbanization estimates are very
similar (e.g. Guiso and Schivardi (forthcoming) and Di Addario and Patacchini, 2008).
14R-squared statistic, measuring the correlation between urbanization and the instruments
after partialling out the eﬀect of the other exogenous variables, has very high values
(above 0.92). The ﬁrst-stage F-statistic of the excluded instruments, a diagnostic tool
to evaluate the seriousness of the ﬁnite-sample bias and instrument weakness (Bound,
Jaeger and Baker, 1995), always rejects the null hypothesis that our instrument is equal
to zero. Since the 2SLS and the probit estimation coeﬃcients are very similar in size
and the Hausman test can never reject the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence between them
(results not reported but available upon request), in what follows we will refer to Table
2’s results as to our main ﬁndings.
4 Potential explanations of the negative urbanization
eﬀect
We have showed that the probability of a college graduate becoming an entrepreneur three
years after graduation decreases with provincial population density. This result holds after
controlling for a wide variety of individual characteristics and regional ﬁxed eﬀects and it is
robust to correcting for the potential endogeneity of urbanization. The lack of endogeneity
is not too surprising in the light of the fact that geographical labour mobility is particularly
low in Italy, especially among self-employed individuals (see Introduction). In this section
we test whether the negative impact of urbanization persists after controlling for some
characteristics of the province of work that might be correlated with population density
(see Table 1). To investigate this possibility, we add the province characteristics described
below (see the Appendix for further details) to our benchmark speciﬁcation (reported in
column 2.5). Since we assume that the provincial variables are exogenous, our approach
is to be considered purely descriptive. Results are shown in Table 4.
First, we test whether the negative urbanization diﬀerential can be explained by the
more intense competition of the densest markets (see Combes et al., 2009), which might
15discourage young people at the beginning of their career. Indeed, rivalry may lower ﬁrms’
price-cost margins, thus requiring a level of eﬃciency that entrepreneurs can acquire only
through experience. We measure competition with the share of the individual sector’s self-
employed workers in total self-employment (column 4.1). As expected, the greater is the
rivalry the less likely it is that graduates will become entrepreneurs. Most importantly,
controlling for competition reduces the size of the urbanization coeﬃcient by almost a
third (from −0.0216 in the benchmark speciﬁcation, to −0.0151).
In the second speciﬁcation (4.2) we test whether young graduates are particularly
discouraged from starting their own business in the most densely populated provinces
because land is more expensive, raising ﬁrms’ ﬁxed set-up costs. In the case of credit
market imperfections, the increased diﬃculties of ﬁnancing the extra initial investment
necessary to cover the higher ﬁxed costs in the most densely populated markets might
be particularly constraining for young entrepreneurs. In the quality-of-life-framework
(Roback, 1982) ﬁrms prefer locating in the most amenity-intensive markets as long as their
utility from productive urban amenities (e.g. availability of infrastructures like airports,
better-quality services, specialized schools, etc.) exceeds the disutility from congestion.6
Congestion may discourage more the young than the experienced entrepreneurs, because
in saturated local markets received prices might be lower than elsewhere (Henderson,
1994), increasing the diﬃculties of starting-up. We measure urban disamenities with
house prices per square metre. Introducing house prices reduces the urbanization eﬀect
(with respect to our benchmark) by just 8 per cent: doubling the province’s population
density reduces the probability of being entrepreneur by 2.0 percentage points.
Third, we test whether young graduates are encouraged to start their activity in
the least densely populated markets because these are endowed with the amenities en-
trepreneurs most appreciate. For instance, entrepreneurs might prefer locating in the
6 However, if the amenities in the most densely populated markets were unproductive (e.g. higher
number of cinemas and theatres, greater variety of shopping centres, wider oﬀer of sport venues, etc.),
entrepreneurs would unambiguously prefer locating in places with fewer amenities, where land prices are
lower. In this case, only employees would prefer living in the most densely populated provinces.
16provinces with a stronger culture of entrepreneurship (Glaeser, 2007), a higher social cap-
ital or a larger presence of local banks. In Italy, the most entrepreneurial areas, richer
in social capital and civic endowment, coincide to a large extent with the municipalities
that become republics in the Middle Ages (as opposed to the Southern monarchical re-
gions), which are, indeed, small- and medium-sized (Putnam, 1993).7 Thus, in column
4.3 we include ﬁve proxies of social capital ` a la Putnam (1993): number of associations
per 100,000 inhabitants, tradition of political autonomy, propensity to collective action,
average voter turnout at all Italian referendums held between 1946 and 1989, and blood
donation (as in Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004). We also add the share of provin-
cial municipalities with a city sewer system and an index of welfare (inversely related to
provincial population density), meant to capture the fact that entrepreneurs might prefer
living in the least densely populated provinces because they oﬀer a better quality of life.
In this speciﬁcation we also control for the share of local banks’ branches in total bank
branches, which is largest in the least dense markets. Indeed, accessing external ﬁnancing
might be particularly diﬃcult for young entrepreneurs (despite being at a stage of life
when they need to rely on it more), because banks judge their activity to be very risky
(see Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 1998). We expect this variable to have a positive direct ef-
fect on entrepreneurship because local banks are thought to facilitate local entrepreneurs’
start-up ﬁnancing as they generally both have local owners and are specialized in provid-
ing credit locally (Farabullini and Gobbi, 2000). Column 4.3 shows that the individuals
living in the provinces with a larger share of local banks have a higher probability of be-
coming entrepreneurs, as expected. The only other signiﬁcantly positive amenity variable
is the propensity to collective action. Overall, urban amenities explain one ﬁfth of the
urbanization eﬀect: doubling population density reduces the chances of entrepreneurship
by 1.8 percentage points.
Fourth, we test whether young graduates are discouraged from starting a business
7 As the author suggests, the current economic development of Italian provinces depends more on the
civic endowment built in the Middle Ages than on their initial economic conditions, and causality runs
from civics to economics rather than the reverse.
17of their own in the most densely populated markets because, on average, they have to
pay higher labour costs. To test this hypothesis we add the provincial average employee
wage, and we ﬁnd that it is not signiﬁcant; the urbanization eﬀect is the same as in the
benchmark speciﬁcation (column 4.4).
Fifth, we test whether the provinces with a higher population density discourage en-
trepreneurship because they oﬀer a wider variety of outside options (e.g. working as
employees in the public sector, in large ﬁrms, etc.). Indeed, the densest markets are
generally endowed with a larger public sector than the least densely populated provinces
and thus have a tendency to oﬀer above all salaried-job opportunities, not encouraging
young graduates to start entrepreneurial activities.8 Conversely, the least densely popu-
lated markets, where the oﬀer of jobs in the public sector is more limited, might provide a
greater incentive for entrepreneurship out of necessity. Thus, in this speciﬁcation we con-
trol for the log of the ratio between average employee wages in the province and average
earnings from entrepreneurship, to test whether or not in the densest market the diﬀer-
ence between earnings from entrepreneurship and wages is suﬃcient to cover the risk of
starting a business activity. However, this variable is non-signiﬁcant and, not surprisingly,
the urbanization eﬀect is the same as in column 2.5 (speciﬁcation 4.5).
Sixth, we test whether the negative urbanization diﬀerential persists after controlling
for two proxies of local economic development: the provincial unemployment rate and
value added per capita in 1994, similarly to Michelacci and Silva (2007).9 Indeed, people
may decide to start an activity of their own out of necessity not only because of the limited
variety of jobs oﬀered, but also because of low chances of employment (especially in a
context of low labour mobility). Thus, if the least densely populated provinces are also the
poorest, our results could be driven by sample composition rather than by urbanization:
8 Along this line, Torrini (2005) shows that in OECD countries the larger the size of the public
sector, the lower self-employment rates. According to the author, the public sector is likely to crowd out
self-employment especially in the general administration (where entrepreneurship does not exist) or in
education and health (where the government is typically more present).
9 Like the authors, we use value added in a year preceding the labour market entrance of the ﬁrst
wave of the sampled individuals (in 1995), because this enables us to capture the eﬀect of an exogenous
variation in local economic development on the probability of being an entrepreneur.
18the greater likelihood of becoming entrepreneurs in the least densely populated markets
could be due to a larger share of individuals lacking alternative opportunities. However,
speciﬁcation (4.6) shows that neither unemployment rates nor value added per capita are
signiﬁcant, implying that in Italy individuals do not generally choose entrepreneurship out
of necessity, in line with Michelacci and Silva (2007). Thus, including the unemployment
rate and value added per capita leaves the urbanization coeﬃcient almost unchanged with
respect to our benchmark speciﬁcation (−0.0187).
Finally, in the last speciﬁcation (4.7) we include all the provincial variables reported in
columns 4.1-4.6. Results indicate that young entrepreneurs are discouraged from starting
a business in the most competitive areas, while they are encouraged by social capital
endowment in the least densely populated markets (in particular, by the presence of local
banks and people’s propensity to collective action). When considered jointly, these factors
explain 55 per cent of the urbanization eﬀect in the benchmark speciﬁcation.
5 Returns to entrepreneurship
We have shown that the more densely populated is the market, the more young graduates
are discouraged from becoming entrepreneurs. In this section we test whether this phe-
nomenon can be explained by the existence of monetary disincentives to entrepreneurship
growing with population density. Indeed, other studies on Italian employees ﬁnd that
graduates are less able than the least educated workers to reap the beneﬁts from ag-
glomeration externalities (whether urban or industrial). For instance, Di Addario and
Patacchini (2008) obtain that employees with at least a university degree earn 0.4 − 0.5
per cent less each 100-inhabitant increase in the population of the local labour market of
residence, even though overall average wages rise by 0.1 per cent. Similarly, according to
de Blasio and Di Addario (2005) graduates’ earnings from salaried work are 9−14 per cent
lower in industrial districts (i.e. the local labour markets with a strong agglomeration of
small- and medium-sized manufacturing ﬁrms) than elsewhere in the country. Conversely,
19employees with primary education or less earn a premium over their counterparts outside
industrial districts.
In fact, the descriptive statistics reported in Table 1 would not support the hypothesis
of negative correlation between earnings from entrepreneurship and provincial population
density because on average entrepreneurs earn about 10 per cent more in the most densely
populated provinces than elsewhere (Table 1). Nevertheless, we examine whether this is
still the case after controlling for individuals’ characteristics. In particular, we estimate
a standard Mincerian earning function (Mincer, 1958) by regressing the logarithm of
entrepreneurs’ monthly earnings on the individual characteristics reported in Table 2.
Results, shown in Table 5 (Panel A), indicate that, after controlling for individual
characteristics, income from entrepreneurship increases with population density, in line
with the predictions of the literature. In particular, the elasticity of young educated
entrepreneurs’ monthly earnings with respect to the province of work population density is
0.02-0.03. However, OLS estimates would be biased and inconsistent if there were omitted
variables aﬀecting both urbanization and entrepreneurs’ earnings (see Section 3.2). Thus,
we re-estimate the earning equation by 2SLS, instrumenting urbanization with the log of
province population density in 1921. Results, shown in Table 5 (Panel B), conﬁrm OLS
ﬁndings.
The ﬁrst-stage results, reported at the bottom of Table 5, indicate that the log of
population density in 1921 is always positive and signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level across
all the columns. The partial R-squared statistic is 0.90 and the F-statistic of the excluded
instruments always rejects the null hypothesis that our instrument is equal to zero. Finally,
the Hausman test fails to reject the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence between the 2SLS and
the OLS coeﬃcients (results available upon request).
Thus, our results indicate that, contrary to employees, entrepreneurs do beneﬁt from
urbanization externalities in monetary terms, at least to the extent that they succeed in
opening an activity in the most densely populated markets.
206 Conclusions
In this paper we analyse empirically the eﬀects of urbanization economies on the proba-
bility that young Italian graduates become entrepreneurs. We ﬁnd that doubling the pop-
ulation density of the province of work lowers the probability of being an entrepreneur
three years after graduation by 2-3 percentage points. This result holds after control-
ling for regional ﬁxed eﬀects and is robust to instrumenting urbanization with the log of
province population density in 1921. Controlling for province competition, urban ameni-
ties and disamenities, average cost of labour, earning diﬀerentials between employees and
self-employed workers, and local economic development eliminates more than half of the
negative urbanization penalty.
We then test whether our results could be explained by the presence of negative diﬀer-
entials in returns to entrepreneurship between the most and the least densely populated
markets. In fact, we ﬁnd that urbanization raises entrepreneurs’ income: the elasticity
of their monthly earnings with respect to population density is 0.02-0.03. Thus, young
entrepreneurs are able to reap the beneﬁts from urbanization externalities, provided that
they succeed in entering the most densely populated markets.
Our results are consistent with the entry cost theory: the locations with a higher
share of entrepreneurs (i.e. the least densely populated ones) also exhibit lower individual
earnings and thus productivity. In contrast, Guiso and Schivardi (forthcoming) obtain
a positive correlation between the incidence of entrepreneurs (of any age and education
level) and TFP, using ﬁrm data at the Italian local labour market level. While our
ﬁndings are certainly valid for young and highly educated entrepreneurs, it would be
interesting to establish whether wider individual data would also conﬁrm our results
for the most experienced and the least educated entrepreneurs, or whether urbanization
externalities diﬀer according to education and/or age. Moreover, while we have studied
the eﬀect of market density on the probability of being an entrepreneur independently
of whether individuals work in the province of birth, Michelacci and Silva (2007) show
21that entrepreneurs generally start their activity in the region of birth, independently of its
population density. Future research could combine the two approaches to analyse if the
eﬀect of population density on entrepreneurial choices depends on whether the individual
works or not in the province of birth.
Finally, our results are policy relevant. In 1995, for instance, the Italian Parliament
passed a bill (L. 95/95) providing subsidies to young entrepreneurs (below 35 years old)
residing in the least developed regions of Italy (i.e. the South), in rural areas or in
zones in industrial decline (the European Commission’s Objectives 1, 2 and 5b).10 This
paper shows that young graduates are discouraged from starting their activity in the most
densely populated provinces, in spite of the fact that they would gain a monetary premium
there. It would thus be advisable to encourage the location of start-up ﬁrms in the densest
rather than in the least densely populated markets, in order to enable young entrepreneurs,
who presumably face greater diﬃculties than more experienced entrepreneurs, to beneﬁt
from urbanization externalities. The importance of graduates’ entrepreneurship should
not be undervalued because the youngest and most highly educated entrepreneurs might
be more likely to introduce innovations than the oldest and least educated businessmen.
10 Of course, young entrepreneurs could still apply for subsidies provided by other laws (e.g. L. 215/92,
L. 236/93, L. 608/95, L. 608/96, L. 135/97 and L. 448/98) tailored for speciﬁc groups (i.e. women, small
ﬁrms, etc.). Law 95/95, speciﬁcally designed for young entrepreneurs, was previously ﬁnanced in 1986
(L. 44/86), but was then circumscribed only to the South (although in 1994 it was extended to some of
the least developed areas in the North). This bill provides both monetary and non-monetary incentives
to locate in the most disadvantaged areas (i.e. subsidies or tax breaks, as well as technical assistance,
tutoring and tailored training courses). Note that in order to test the eﬀect of this law we would need
data at the municipality level, while we only have them at the provincial level.
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Appendix
Description of the provincial level variables
Share of self-employed workers in the individual’s sector in province total self-employed
workers. Source: ISTAT.
House prices per square metre (in 2004). Source: Consulente Immobiliare. The prices,
provided by real-estate agents, are those actually paid in transactions. We average the
prices collected in the town centres, suburbs and in-between areas to take into account
house location. We also take into account the age of the building by averaging the prices
of recently built and new houses.
Share of local bank branches in province total bank branches (in 2001). Source: Bank
of Italy. Local banks are the banks whose average investment funds amount to less than
9 billion euros.
Tradition of political autonomy. Source: Isl-University of Parma. This is a dummy
variable equal to one if the province has a long-standing tradition of political autonomy
(zero if the province belonged to the Vatican State or was a monarchy before Italy’s
foundation).
Propensity to collective action. Source: Arrighetti, Lasagni and Serravalli (2001).
This variable has been computed with a principal-component analysis on the basis of the
following variables: the share of craft workers joining artisan associations in the number
23of artisan ﬁrms put on the register in 1970; the ratio between the number of votes in the
1970 elections for the Provincial Board of Artisans and the number of artisans put on the
register in 1970; the share of farms selling products to agricultural cooperatives in the
number of farms in 1970; the ratio between the people joining buying associations and
the number of trade licences in 1965; a dummy variable equal to one if the province has
at least one joint-surety association on bank loans joining Artigianﬁdi that was founded
before 1975 (and zero otherwise).
Average voter turnout at all Italian referendums held in the period 1946-1989. Source:
Guiso et al.’s (2004) elaboration on data from the Italian Ministry of the Interior. The
referendums held in the period considered were on the following subjects: choice between
Monarchy and Republic (1946); divorce (1974); public ﬁnancing to political parties (1978);
anti-terrorism legislation and abortion (1981); cost-of-living index (1985); nuclear energy
and hunting regulation (1987).
Number of blood bags donated in the province per 1 million AVIS inhabitants (in 1995).
Source: AVIS (Italian Voluntary Blood Donor Association). Each bag contains 16 oz. of
blood. In four provinces (Genova, Caserta, Avellino and Caltanissetta) the value is set to
zero because they do not host AVIS and presumably have very few blood donations.
Average number of associations per 100,000 inhabitants (in 1985). Source: Isl-University
of Parma. This variable has been computed by subtracting sports and other associations
from the total. The municipal tourist board associations are instead included.
Share of provincial municipalities with a city sewer system. Source: ISTAT.
Welfare index. Source: Il Sole 24 Ore. The index, named Gross Domestic Welfare, is
a combination of 8 variables at the provincial level: value added per inhabitant at current
prices, life expectation at birth, enrolment rate at university, per capita expenditure on
entertainment, participation in European elections in 2009, tons of CO2 in real value
added, number of thefts, burglaries, and murders per 100,000 inhabitants, number of
voluntary work associations per 1,000 inhabitants.
24Average employee wages. Source: ISTAT. This variable, obtained from the SECCG,
is the average of graduate earnings (3 years after graduation) at the provincial level.
Employee-self-employed earning ratio. Source: ISTAT. This variable, obtained from
the SECCG, is the ratio of average wages for employees and average earnings from en-
trepreneurship.
Unemployment rate. Source: ISTAT.
Value added in 1994. Source: ISTAT.
Population size in 1921. Source: ISTAT.
25Table 1. Summary statistics
All sample Densest provinces Rest of the country
mean st.dev mean st.dev mean st.dev
employees*** 0.67 0.47 0.71 0.45 0.65 0.48
entrepreneurs*** 0.17 0.38 0.16 0.36 0.15 0.36
self-employed (except for entrepreneurs) 0.16 0.36 1100.42 436.29 1,000.75 455.19
monthly wage from entrepreneurship† *** 1,037.00 450.95 1,089.46 449.11 995.72 448.12
Personal characteristics:
female*** 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.50
married*** 0.19 0.39 0.17 0.38 0.20 0.40
age*** 29.57 2.01 29.42 1.94 29.65 2.03
Ph.D. 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05
number of siblings* 1.25 0.88 1.23 0.86 1.26 0.89
School characteristics:
Liceo*** 0.64 0.48 0.69 0.46 0.61 0.49
teachers’ training school*** 0.05 0.21 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.23
technical school*** 0.28 0.45 0.25 0.43 0.30 0.46
vocational school 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.18
Type of degree:
chemistry-pharmaceutical*** 0.07 0.25 0.05 0.23 0.08 0.27
biology and geology*** 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.23
science*** 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24
medicine*** 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.21
engineering*** 0.19 0.40 0.22 0.41 0.19 0.39
architecture 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.21
agriculture*** 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.17
economics and statistics*** 0.19 0.39 0.22 0.41 0.18 0.38
political and social science *** 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.26 0.05 0.22
law*** 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27
humanities*** 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.26
foreign languages*** 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.23
teaching*** 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.18
psychology** 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.16
Father’s education
primary education*** 0.17 0.38 0.13 0.34 0.20 0.40
lower secondary school*** 0.24 0.43 0.22 0.42 0.26 0.44
upper secondary school*** 0.36 0.48 0.39 0.49 0.34 0.47
university degree*** 0.22 0.41 0.25 0.43 0.20 0.40
Mother’s education
primary education*** 0.23 0.42 0.18 0.38 0.26 0.44
lower secondary school*** 0.27 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.28 0.45
upper secondary school*** 0.35 0.48 0.38 0.49 0.33 0.47
university degree*** 0.15 0.35 0.17 0.38 0.13 0.34
Parents’ occupational status
self-employed father*** 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.26
self-employed mother*** 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.09
Ability proxies:
ﬁnal mark at university*** 103.01 7.04 102.81 7.30 103.18 6.84
honours 0.21 0.40 0.21 0.41 0.20 0.40
graduated on time*** 0.15 0.36 0.16 0.37 0.15 0.35
While studying:
worked occasionally *** 0.51 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.51 0.50
worked continuously*** 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.28 0.07 0.26
never worked*** 0.41 0.49 0.38 0.48 0.43 0.49
family network*** 0.68 0.46 0.60 0.49 0.72 0.45
26Table 1. Summary statistics (ctd.)
All sample Densest provinces Rest of the country
mean st.dev mean st.dev mean st.dev
Sector of work
chemical sector** 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.25
machinery*** 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.24 0.03 0.16
construction*** 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.25
other industrial sectors*** 0.18 0.38 0.19 0.39 0.17 0.37
trade and hotels*** 0.07 0.26 0.11 0.31 0.05 0.23
transportation, tours, postal services and telecommunications*** 0.10 0.30 0.07 0.26 0.11 0.32
credit and insurance*** 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27 0.11 0.31
other professional and consulting activities*** 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.29
IT and similar activities 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.23
education and training 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.22
health and social services*** 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.27
public administration*** 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.17
other social services 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27
experience in months*** 23.61 11.97 23.95 11.95 23.61 11.97
1998*** 0.27 0.44 0.25 0.43 0.28 0.45
2001*** 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48 0.33 0.47
2004 0.37 0.48 0.37 0.48 0.37 0.48
Characteristics of the province of work:‡
population density*** 2.43 3.30 8.97 7.24 1.65 0.82
unemployment rate 9.20 7.42 7.05 6.79 9.45 7.49
value added (in 1994) 20.69 8.20 23.72 5.68 20.33 8.40
share of self-employed workers in the individual’s sector*** 0.15 0.02 0.18 0.02 0.15 0.02
house prices per square metre*** 3,896.44 1,259.61 4,858.33 1,883.30 3,781.43 1,124.02
share of local bank branches in total branches* 0.39 0.19 0.29 0.15 0.40 0.19
tradition of political autonomy 0.49 0.50 0.55 0.52 0.48 0.50
collective action propensity -0.01 1.00 0.40 0.91 -0.06 1.00
blood donation 28.39 21.33 29.57 21.63 28.25 21.41
number of associations per 100,000 inhabitants (in 1985) 30.47 20.86 31.96 15.32 30.29 21.49
welfare index 105.05 30.76 105.99 27.68 104.93 31.25
voter turnover at 1946-1989 referendums* 80.14 8.27 84.30 7.77 79.64 8.23
share of municipalities with city sewer system 98.30 7.05 96.43 9.89 98.52 6.67
employee-self-employed earning ratio (in log) 1.01 0.02 1.00 0.01 1.01 0.02
average wages of employees (in log) 1.87 0.06 1.88 0.05 1.87 0.06
TOTAL 33,740 14,806 18,934
Note: Computed on employed individuals. Variables denoted with * (**) [***] indicate that the diﬀerence between the most densely
populated provinces and the rest of the country is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 (5) [1] per cent level. The provinces in the top
10th percentile of the population density distribution (i.e. having more than 383,437 inhabitants per square kilometre), deﬁned as
the densest provinces, are Naples, Milan, Trieste, Rome, Varese, Prato, Rimini, Genoa, Como, Padova and Lecco. † Computed on
4,533 individuals (i.e. the entrepreneurs). ‡ Provincial characteristics have been computed on the universe of provinces. ? Per 100
inhabitants per square kilometre. See the Appendix for a detailed description of the provincial variables.
27Table 2: Urbanization eﬀect on the probability of being entrepreneur (marginal eﬀects)
2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5
population density (in log) -0.0300*** -0.0261*** -0.0273*** -0.0213*** -0.0216***
(0.0041) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0032)
female -0.0661*** -0.0611*** -0.0591*** -0.0578*** -0.0577***
(0.0064) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0032)
married 0.003 0.0122** 0.0123** 0.0127** 0.0148***
(0.0057) (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0045)
age -0.0699*** -0.0466** -0.0389** -0.0356* -0.0297*
(0.0212) (0.0198) (0.0197) (0.0189) (0.0152)
age squared 0.0013*** 0.0008** 0.0007** 0.0007** 0.0005**
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Ph.D. -0.0054 -0.0385 -0.0354 -0.0383 -0.0125
(0.0406) (0.0307) (0.0317) (0.0299) (0.0302)
number of siblings 0.0015 -0.0001 -0.0009 0.0033 0.0018
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0022)
School characteristics: liceo omitted
teachers’ training school -0.0399*** -0.0327*** -0.0334*** -0.0168*
(0.0103) (0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0101)
technical school -0.007 0.0038 0.0018 -0.0031
(0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0044)
vocational school 0.0114 0.0240** 0.0197* 0.0209**
(0.0104) (0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0105)
Father’s education: primary education omitted
lower secondary school 0.0069 0.0068 0.0108*
(0.0069) (0.0067) (0.0064)
upper secondary school 0.0051 0.0035 0.0071
(0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0069)
university degree 0.0242** 0.0205** 0.0143
(0.0106) (0.0096) (0.0087)
Mother’s education: primary education omitted
lower secondary school 0.0072 0.0049 0.0047
(0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0054)
upper secondary school 0.0144** 0.0133** 0.0098*
(0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0055)
university degree 0.0081 0.0086 0.0069
(0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0082)
Parents’ occupational status
self-employed father 0.0934*** 0.0860*** 0.0559***
(0.0074) (0.0073) (0.0068)
self-employed mother 0.0377** 0.0368* 0.0194
(0.0188) (0.0192) (0.0160)
Ability proxies:
ﬁnal mark at university 0.0095 -0.0007
(0.0075) (0.0062)




graduated on time 0.0130** 0.0115**
(0.0051) (0.0045)
While studying: never worked omitted
worked occasionally -0.0184*** -0.0169***
(0.0039) (0.0035)
worked continuously -0.0067 -0.0098*
(0.0065) (0.0056)
family network 0.0766*** 0.0565***
(0.0067) (0.0041)
experience in months 0.0017***
(0.0002)
Survey year YES YES YES YES YES
Region dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Type of degree YES YES YES YES YES
Sector of work NO NO NO NO YES
Observations 33,740 33,740 33,740 33,740 33,740
Note: White-robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the provincial level are reported in paren-
theses. The type of degree categories include: chemistry-pharmaceutical, biology and geology, medicine,
science, engineering, architecture, agriculture, political and social science, law, humanities, foreign lan-
guages, teaching, and psychology (economics and statistics omitted). The sector categories include: dis-
tribution services, hotels and restaurants; transport, travel and communication services; ﬁnancial services;
professional services (legal and architectural services, consultancies, market research, public opinion polling
services, real-estate services, rental/leasing services, advertising and research and development); computer
and related services; educational services; health related and social services; public administration; chem-
icals, drugs and pharmaceuticals; engineering industry, machinery and equipment; other industries; and
construction (other public, social and personal services omitted). Omitted region: Piedmont. Symbols:
The asterisk * (**) [***] indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 10 (5) [1] per cent level.
28Table 3: Instrumental variables estimates of the urbanization eﬀect on the probability of being entrepreneur
3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5
population density (in log) -0.0318*** -0.0261*** -0.0272*** -0.0209*** -0.0243***
(0.0041) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0039) (0.0037)
Instruments
population density in 1921 (in log) 1.1895*** 1.1882*** 1.1880*** 1.1867*** 1.18461***
(0.0440) (0.0438) (0.0438) (0.0437) (0.0436)
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments: 0.8999 0.8994 0.8991 0.8979 0.8970
Test of excluded instruments (F-test): 731.26 735.79 735.48 735.55 738.2400
Observations 33,740 33,740 33,740 33,740 33,740
Note: White-robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the provincial level are reported in parentheses. In
columns (3.1)-(3.5) we control for the same covariates as in Table 2. The asterisk * (**) [***] indicates statistical
signiﬁcance at the 10 (5) [1] per cent level.
Table 4: Urbanization eﬀect on the probability of being entrepreneur: testing alternative hypotheses (marginal eﬀects)
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7
population density (in log) -0.0151*** -0.0197*** -0.0176*** -0.0215*** -0.0216*** -0.0187*** -0.0094**
(0.0028) (0.0035) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0037) (0.0039)
share of self-employed workers in the individual’s sector -0.2979*** -0.2909***
(0.0606) (0.0601)
house price per square metre† -0.0023 -0.0019
(0.0022) (0.0022)
share of local banks in total branches 0.0516** 0.0450**
(0.0203) (0.0189)
tradition of political autonomy 0.0061 0.0043
(0.0059) (0.0052)
collective action propensity 0.0139*** 0.0132***
(0.0044) (0.0047)
blood donation 0.0001 0.0000
(0.0002) (0.0002)
no. of associations per 100,000 inhabitants (in 1985) -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
welfare index -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001)
voter turnover at 1946-1989 referendums 0.0012 0.0016
(0.0010) (0.0010)
share of municipalities with city sewer system 0.0002 0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0003)
average employees wages (in log)‡ -0.0214 -0.0093
(0.0384) (0.0398)
employees/self-employed earning ratio (in log)‡ -0.071 -0.0263
(0.0800) (0.0825)
unemployment rate -0.0011 -0.0008
(0.0007) (0.0008)
value added (in 1994) -0.0004 0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Observations 33,740 33,740 33,740 33,737 33,737 33,737 33,737
Note: White-robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the provincial level are reported in parentheses. † Coeﬃcient multiplied by 100. ‡ Averages
computed by province and year. In all the columns we control for the same covariates as in speciﬁcation (2.5) (Table 2). For a detailed explanation of the
provincial variables, see the Appendix. The asterisk * (**) [***] indicates statistical signiﬁcance at the 10 (5) [1] per cent level.
Table 5: Urbanization eﬀect on log monthly earnings from entrepreneurship
5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.6
PANEL A: OLS
population density (in log) 0.0230** 0.0295*** 0.0275*** 0.0201* 0.0181*
(0.0103) (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0102)
PANEL B: IV
density (in log) 0.0231** 0.0280*** 0.0260*** 0.0187* 0.0168*
(0.0101) (0.0098) (0.0097) (0.0097) (0.0096)
First stage - Instruments
Population density in 1921 (in log) 1.1796*** 1.1780*** 1.1775*** 1.1762*** 1.1764***
(0.0411) (0.0408) (0.0407) (0.0407) (0.0406)
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments: 0.8976 0.8967 0.8964 0.8954 0.8953
Test of excluded instruments (F-test): 822.31 833.58 834.66 835.64 841.23
Observations 4,533 4,533 4,533 4,533 4,533
Note: White-robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the provincial level are reported in parentheses. OLS coeﬃcients are
marginal eﬀects. In columns (5.1)-(5.5) we control for the same covariates as in Table 2. The asterisk * (**) [***] indicates statistical
signiﬁcance at the 10 (5) [1] per cent level.
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